If the government has the ability and willingness to redistribute the surplus created by an external investor, why do we still observe resistance to such investment, sometimes in the form of destruction of productive assets? And how does such destructive action a¤ect a government's "investor-friendliness"? In a simple model where di¤erent social groups have di¤erent and uncertain valuation of productive investment brought in from outside, we explain such surplus destruction as a credible signal sent to the government by an a¤ected group of its low valuation. The information-constrained government values such a signal and uses it to implement a better redistribution scheme. Such destructive action is decreasing in the extent that the government cares for the a¤ected group. Under full information, the government taxes the investor if the investor's marginal valuation of the investment is higher than that of the society and subsidises the investor otherwise. Surplus destruction makes the government weaker in negotiating with the investor, i.e. more prone to providing subsidies to compensate for the investor's loss due to destruction. If two governments compete to attract the same investor, we show that there is a "subsidy war", and while the investor bene…ts from such competition at the cost of the societies, there may be an ex-post ine¢ ciency, i.e. investment can move to the less pro…table destination. Resistance to investment may have counterintuitive e¤ects on a government's negotiating power under competition.
Introduction
Over the last decade, local, provincial and national governments the world over have been increasingly relying on outside private investors to provide the impetus for growth in jobs and output (Balassa [1] ; Corbo et al. [3] ; Lal [6] ; Khan and Reinhart [5] ). Governments are actively pursuing private capital by providing incentives and otherwise creating conditions favorable for investment. Industry groups monitor the "investor-friendliness" of governments, and governments often compete with each other in wooing private capital (see a survey by Lim [7] ). Concomitantly, there is a rising trend, especially in the third world, of local communities resisting non-local private capital (see Bardhan [2] in the context of India; Rodrik [11] , Stiglitz [12] ). Some of this resistance has gone beyond protests and demonstrations and taken the form of actual destruction of productive assets, disruption of production, or in some other way creating conditions that lower the productive capacity of the investor. As globalization spreads deeper into the developing world, one can expect such occurrences only to grow in frequency and intensity.
What is puzzling about these protests is that local communities seem to be resisting precisely what is necessary to lift them out of the poverty trap. The simplistic explanation that globalization always leaves local communities impoverished is inconsistent with the idea that the government can redistribute surplus from productive investment. Theoretically, as long as there is a positive surplus created from investment, the government can ensure that it is distributed in such a way that makes everyone better o¤: thus, destructive activities that ultimately reduce the available surplus seem counterproductive.
In this paper, we posit a rational explanation of why we observe destruction of productive assets (or more broadly, activities that adversely a¤ect the investment climate) by purported bene…ciaries of the investment even when the government is willing and able to redistribute the surplus from investment, and is in no way interested in the bene…t of the external investor.
In our theory, di¤erent social groups (skilled vs. unskilled labor, industry vs. agriculture) value investment di¤erently, and when the government o¤ers conditions to the investor there is considerable uncertainty about the actual bene…ts to di¤erent groups.
These valuations are realized at the interim stage (actual number of jobs created, multiplier e¤ect, etc) by the respective groups, but the government cannot directly elicit this information through the democratic process. In this situation, the group with low marginal valuation of surplus uses such destruction as a credible signal of its valuation, and the government implements an appropriate redistribution scheme taking into account this information. 1 In this way, the destruction of some investment can be read as a last-resort way for those who lose from the project (relative to others) to demand redistribution or compensation from the government. 2 Notice that such destructive means need to be resorted to only in absence of other channels of upward ‡ow of information, which is a hallmark of underdeveloped political institutions and in presence of more extreme uncertainty about the e¤ect of investments on di¤erent social groups, which is the case when markets are underdeveloped and there are large positive or negative externalities. This probably explains why the phenomenon of destructive resistance to private investment is common the developing world and not the developed world. Even within the developing economies, the extent and intensity of resistance seems to be higher in communities that are more marginalized within the society.
Our model presents comparative static results that are consistent with this observation: ceteris paribus, the less the government cares about a particular social group, the higher will be the extent of the resistance mounted by the group.
In our model, while the government values the welfare of di¤erent social groups asymmetrically, it does not care directly about the pro…ts of the external investor. We do not intend this as an assertion about reality that there is never any covert nexus between the government and the external investor. On the contrary, our intention in making this assumption is to demonstrate that we may have resistance to investment even in absence of such a nexus. Violent protests may arise due to informational constraints in the society even with the most benign of governments. In turn, an implication of our model is that a more representative government (a "people's government") will not make the problem of resistance to investment vanish. We suggest that it is also necessary to address the rigidities and bottlenecks in the institutions of upward information ‡ow in the society.
In addition, the fact that the government values the relationship with the investor only in terms of the possible gains to the groups internal to the society helps us endogenise the extent of "investor-friendliness" of the government. In particular, we analyze conditions under which the government should tax the investor and distribute pro…ts within the society or o¤er a subsidy to lure the investor at the cost of the society. The tax or subsidy is used as an instrument to a¤ect the scale of investment. If the investor's marginal bene…t from the scale of the project is lower than that of marginal bene…t to the society, the government should subsidize the investor to induce higher investment, and tax the investor 1 Use of costly action to signal valuation in the context of redistribution is analyzed in Harstad [4] . In his paper, groups signal their valuation be delaying, thereby reducing the current value of the project.
2 Models of costly political actions are not common in the positive political theory literature. Exceptions include Lohmann , [8] , [9] and [10] .
and redistribute the proceeds otherwise. The possibility of asset destruction suppresses the scale of investment: and thus the government has to compensate the investor from loss due to destruction. Thus, while the popular left deems resistance to private investors as a response to the government "selling out", we argue that there is a reverse causality too: the possibility of asset destruction weakens the government in its negotiations with the investor and forces it to make concessions that would be unnecessary in absence of the possibility. This presents the government with a trade-o¤: while asset destruction provides information regarding valuations of groups that help in setting a better redistributive scheme within the society, it comes at a social cost of muted incentives for the external investor who needs to be compensated.
In a later section, we develop a model of competition between governments in order to attract the same investor. In the spirit of Bertrand competition, there is a "subsidy war", and while the investor bene…ts from such competition at the cost of the societies, there may be an ex-post ine¢ ciency, i.e. investment can move to the less pro…table destination.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic model where the investor considers only one destination for the proposed investment. Section 3 analyses the problem, discusses the tradeo¤s and solves the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses comparative static results of the basic model. Section 5 presents a model where two governments compete for the investor. Section 6 concludes.
Basic Model
Suppose there is a presumably large project that would bene…t the local economy, but the resources (technical, …nancial, human) necessary for the project are not available locally.
The government identi…es an external player with such resources, and o¤ers a deal to induce investment. It is reasonable to assume that the government will stand by its contractual obligations. However, the project bene…ts the groups in the society unevenly, and the government redistributes the bene…ts to maximize social welfare. However, these bene…ts are realised only after the project is under way, and are private information to the respective groups. The government uses information inferred from public action by losing groups to implement the optimal redistribution scheme. However, the credibility of public action comes at the cost of destruction of economic surplus, and the government has to compensate the investor for possible loss in surplus. This compensation is …nanced through a tax on the society. Thus, while resistance has an informational value allowing the government to better redistribute surplus, it comes at the cost of reducing the total surplus created for the society through two channels: one, the direct channel of destructive public action and two, the muted incentive for the investor. 
Speci…cation of the game
The problem may be cast as a game among the following players: the government G, an external investor I and two groups of citizens; A and B. G seeks investment from I to implement a project. It o¤ers an investment tax 2 R to the investor on the size of the investment in the project. A negative value of means that the government o¤ers a subsidy. Based on the value of ; I decides on the size of the project x 0 and incurs an investment cost that is strictly convex and increasing in x: We assume that the investment cost is given by
2k ; where k > 0: G does not get any direct payo¤ from the project. It however cares for the social groups (A and B) who derive utility from the project. Groups have di¤erent valuations of the project. Group i's total valuation of the project is given by v i x when the size of investment is x. We assume that marginal valuation for both groups is independent of the size of the project. While v A is assumed to be …xed; v B can be either v (with probability p) or v(with probability 1 p): We assume that p 2 (0; 1) and v > v:
While the distribution of v B is commonly known, v B itself is realized after the investment is made and cost is incurred by the investor. The realization is observed only by members of group B: We assume that B can take an action to signal its valuation to G. This action has a public cost. In particular, by taking an action of level a 0, it e¤ectively reduces the size of the investment by ax: Notice that the action reduces the value of investment both to the investor and to the two groups. Following an action of level a, group i's payo¤ becomes v i x(1 a).
In our framework, G decides on two di¤erent types redistributive transfer. First, because of investment tax, a redistribution of surplus takes place between the investor and the groups of citizens. If there is a positive investment tax (when > 0), G distributes the tax revenue among the citizens. Conversely, when o¤ering a subsidy to I (when < 0), G collects the subsidy from groups. Let u i ; i = A; B denote group i's surplus such that u A = v A x(1 a) + s x and u B = v B x(1 a) + (1 s) x, where s is the proportion at which the tax/subsidy revenue is split between two groups. We will show in the analytical section, the choice of s will not be a strategic consideration for G. We therefore assume that s is …xed for simplicity. Next, at the …nal stage, after observing the size of the investment and any action, if taken by B, G decides on a redistributive transfer between groups. Let t 2 R denote the redistributive transfer from A to B. Therefore, post-transfer surplus of groups A and B are given by
We assume that G cares for both groups'utilities, and its payo¤ is given by
The parameter 2 (0; 1) can be interpreted as the relative extent to which the government cares about the welfare of group B compared to group A: We denote the social surplus created from the project, given an investment tax , an action of level a and size of investment x, by S ( ; x; a) = (v A + v B )x(1 a) + x. This is the amount available to the government for redistribution within groups. Notice that S ( ; x; a) = u A + u B :
The following condition is assumed throughout our analysis.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the project is large enough to implement so that it produces positive surplus in every state. By making this assumption, we move away from the 'adverse selection' problem of choosing bad projects, and focus only on the informational problem related to the redistribution of surplus.
The investor's payo¤ is
The sequence of events is described below:
1. Policy stage: G decides the investment tax/subsidy . 
Underlying assumptions
In the basic model, the government is the sole buyer of the investor's services. This can be the case if the particular investment opportunity may be unavailable anywhere else. A geographically speci…c investment opportunity (e.g. mining) may be a speci…c example of this situation. In section 5, we consider a situation where the investor can invest in one of two locations, and governments in these two locations compete to attract the investor.
Policy Stage
The tax or subsidy o¤ered by the government can be thought of as a proxy for the details of the contract signed between the government and the investor, and captures the extent of investor friendliness of the government. Since is modelled as the government's instrument for inducing a higher scale of investment, we consider it as a tax imposed per unit of the scale of investment. The contract between the government and investor is signed before the government knows the exact social valuation of the investment. It is assumed that the government commits not to renegotiate on the contract with the investor once the valuation to the social groups is known. Notice that the government also has the option not to o¤er any deal to the investor by setting = 0:
Investment stage
The variable x can be thought of interchangeably as the scale or size of investment or the level of output per unit time. While we realize that the former is a stock concept and the latter is a ‡ow, we do not distinguish between the two as they are obviously positively correlated. The particular functional form of the payo¤ to the investor embodies certain underlying assumptions. First, the tax has to be paid on the entire scale of investment
x and the investor cannot claim immunity from paying tax on production (or productive capacity) lost due to popular resistance. Second, the term
2k should be thought of as the cost of producing output x; and k measures the productivity of the project. The parameter k is speci…c to the location of investment, and captures the extent to which a location is attractive to the investor irrespective of the deal o¤ered by the government. While k does not play a strategic role in the benchmark case where there is just one location under consideration, it acquires prime importance when two governments are competing for investment. The …rst term can be thought of as the "revenue" of the investor. Since an amount ax of the output is destroyed due to resistance, the investor gets to "sell" only the e¤ective output, i.e. x(1 a). The price per unit of output sold is normalized to 1:
Notice that the investor has the option of not to invest, i.e. choose x = 0; and then all parties receive a payo¤ of zero.
Signaling stage
Di¤erent groups in the society are a¤ected in di¤erent ways by the proposed investment.
New technology may compete away existing industries, displace land and livelihood and on the other hand bene…t those engaged in ancillary industries. Jobs are created in the new entity and through a multiplier e¤ect. Because of these externalities, the extent of the gains and the identity of the gainers and losers from such a change in the economic landscape may not be immediately obvious and are known only at an interim stage after the proposed investment is made. Also, the extent of gain or loss increases with the scale of the project. To capture the idea that destroyed surplus is a loss for everyone, the valuation depends only on the e¤ective output that remains after destruction, i.e. x(1 a): Since the marginal valuations play such an important role in determining the incentive for action, we hold the marginal valuations v i constant and treat them as parameters. Thus, the total valuation of group i from the investment is v i x(1 a):
The government is interested in redistributing the total gains created in the economy according to some social welfare function which we shall presently discuss, but it is constrained by the fact that it cannot directly observe the bene…ts. In particular, attempts to elicit information by asking the respective groups will fail since the groups will overstate their losses and understate their gains so as to attract redistributive bene…ts. Under such a situation, a group with low (not necessarily negative) marginal valuation of the investment has an incentive to destroy some surplus to credibly signal its low valuation, and the government can use this information to implement the redistribution scheme 3 . To capture the issue of redistribution, we need at least two groups, but it is enough to have uncertainty in the valuation of one group to analyze the credibility problem. We suppress the uncertainty in valuation of group A for the sake of parsimony. One can also think of group B as the "a¤ected group".
Redistribution stage
The investor is truly external to the society in that the government does not care about protecting his pro…ts. The government cares only about the groups in the society, but may discriminate between the two groups. The parameter may capture a wide variety of things: extent of competitiveness in the political system (how far is away from 1 2 ), how fringe/marginal the "a¤ected" group is (low ), the size of the a¤ected group (high ), whether the party in power represents the a¤ected group (high ), number of "swing" voters in the a¤ected group (high ) Assuming that group A is the one that has certain and positive bene…t from investment, (1 ) may also be an exogenous proxy for investorfriendliness. At this stage, we simply note that the precise interpretation of is irrelevant for the purpose of the model.
We shall see later that in a separating equilibrium, the optimal redistribution scheme is to divide the total social surplus in the ratio of weights of the groups. In particular, the value of s, i.e. the rule determining how the tax revenue from the investor would be distributed (or how the subsidy would be …nanced), does not matter. The group utilities are also given by their respective shares of surplus. Thus, it is in the interest of each group to maximize total surplus 4 : the only rationale for surplus destruction is informational, and it is in the mutual interest of the a¤ected group and the government. First, it decides on an investment tax that will be imposed on the investor. Finally, after observing the action taken by B, G decides on a redistributive transfer between A and B. Therefore, G 's strategy is given by a tuple ( ; t) such that 2 R is the investment tax and and t : R R R + ! R is a mapping such that t ( ; x; a) is the redistributive transfer from A to B, given an investment tax , size of investment x and action level a. 
The benchmark case: No signalling
As a point of comparison, it is useful to begin our analysis by looking at the problem without the signalling stage. Consider a situation in which G has a zero-cost mechanism to …nd out the true valuation of the project to each group. Then the total surplus available to the government for redistribution within groups is S ( ; x; 0) = (v A + v B + )x, given the investment tax and the size of investment x. At the redistribution stage, G chooses t 2 R to maximize
From inspection of the …rst order condition, we see that the optimal group transfer is given by
, and the payo¤s of groups A and B are given by (1 ) S ( ; x; 0) and S ( ; x; 0) respectively. Since groups are not taking any action that is costly to the investor, it is easy to see that I's choice of investment will be independent of the choice of optimal transfer t o .
I chooses x to maximize
The optimal size of investment is given by
Next we consider G's payo¤. If B's true marginal valuation is v B , then G's payo¤ is given by (1 )
Therefore, G's expected payo¤ is 
From the above analysis, we see that o is positive if and only if v A + Ev B is less than 1. Therefore, if sum of groups' expected marginal valuation is less than the investor's marginal valuation, G will tax the investor. Otherwise, the investment will be subsidized.
The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 Consider a situation when G can …nd out the realization of groups'marginal valuation of the project at zero cost. G will tax the investor if the sum of groups' expected marginal valuations of output is less than the investor's marginal revenue from output. Otherwise, G will subsidize the investment.
The debate regarding investor-friendliness of governments seems to be cast in terms of two extreme ideological positions: while the right claims that governments should do everything in their power to allure foreign investors, the left suggests that pro…t-makers be taxed heavily. Our theory suggests that government should use taxes or subsidies to induce the investor to invest at a scale that is optimal for the society. If the valuations were not private information, the government would tax (subsidize) the investor if the investor's "price" obtained per unit of output is greater (less) than the sum of marginal valuations of the social groups 5 .
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze the problem with possibility of signalling. We solve the game by backward induction.
Consider the redistribution stage. Assume that the investment tax , the size of investment x and the level of action a are known. In any separating equilibrium, group B's true valuation will be revealed with certainty. We therefore, look at the optimal between-group transfer when G knows the realized value of v B . The optimal transfer under perfect information is given by
Post-transfer group payo¤s are
Group B : u B + t e = S ( ; x; a) .
Next, consider the signaling stage. Assume that the investment tax and the size of investment x are known. The following lemma shows that B will take the costly action only if it has low valuation for the project. The key to this is showing that B can always signal its high valuation by not taking any action in a separating equilibrium. 5 In general, if the social valuation of investment is VG(x) and that of the investor is VI (x); and if VI (x)
is concave, the government essentially chooses x opt such that
and sets as M VI (x opt ) = :
Lemma 1 In any separating signaling equilibrium, B will take no action if it has a high marginal valuation for the project.
Proof. If possible, suppose there be a separating equilibrium in which B takes a costly action a 0 > 0 to signal its high valuation. At the equilibrium, G believes that B has high valuation with probability 1, if it observes an action of level a 0 . Therefore, B receives the lowest possible transfer. Consider a probable deviation by B, taking no action. G's belief that B has high valuation would be at most 1. B would therefore gets a transfer which is as high as it would get at the equilibrium. Moreover, by not taking action, it does not reduce the e¤ective size of the project. Therefore, B can make a pro…table deviation from the equilibrium by not taking any action. Hence the contradiction.
To derive the optimal level of action B would take to signal its type when it has low valuation, we compare its payo¤ from misrepresenting its type with its payo¤ from revealing the true type. Suppose, v B = v. If B is revealed as having high valuation by taking no action, it receives a transfer
In contrast, if B is revealed as having low valuation, it receives
Subtracting (4) from (5), we see that the gain in transfer, denoted by t (a), from representing oneself as of having low valuation by taking an action of level a is given by
On the other hand, by revealing its low type, B destroys its own surplus by an amount of vax. Therefore, the condition for B, when it has low valuation, not to misrepresent its own type
Similarly, the condition for B, when it has high valuation, not to misrepresent its own type t (a) vax.
After rearranging terms, we see that in any separating equilibrium,
ministic belief structure, such as (v) = 1 if a = a e , and 0 otherwise. The following lemma characterizes the range of feasible actions supported in a separating equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In any separating signaling equilibrium, the optimal action a e by B, if it has low valuation, satis…es (6).
Lemma 2 shows that there are in…nitely many levels of action that can be supported in a separating equilibrium. Later, for the purpose of tractability, we will restrict our attention to the one that maximizes G's objective function. For the time being, we will analyze the investment stage with an assumption that at the signaling stage, group B , if it has low valuation, takes some action of level a e , satisfying (6).
To solve for the optimal size of investment, assume that the tax rate is given. I chooses x to maximize its expected return from investment
At the policy stage, G decides the optimal investment tax that maximizes its expected payo¤. From (2) and (3), we see that if v B is truthfully revealed, G's payo¤ is
Therefore, in any separating equilibrium, G's expected payo¤ at the policy stage is given by EW = (1 )
The optimal investment tax is
From Proposition 1, we can rewrite the expression 9 and show that the overall tax rate o¤ered by the government involves two parts: an incentive part Proposition 2 G will tax the investor if
Otherwise, G will subsidize the investment.
Hence, e < 0. If v A + v 1 < 0, there are two possibilities, depending on the values of p and a e -either v A + v 1 < pa e v A + v 1 < v A + Ev B 1, in which case e < 0,
Comparing the above result with Proposition 1, we see that the set of projects for which the government taxes the investor under costly signaling is a subset of the set for which the government would tax the investor under the …rst best condition (i.e. with no information constraint). In particular, if the following condition holds, G would subsidize the investment under costly signalling but would not have done so otherwise:
The set of separating equilibria is large and can support in…nitely many actions in the signalling game. To get more tractability of our results, we restrict our attention to the one that maximizes G's equilibrium payo¤. We call it the welfare-maximizing equilibrium of the game. We will see later that the investor's equilibrium payo¤ is also maximized at the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. This provides further justi…cation for restricting our attention to the welfare-maximizing equilibrium of the game.
Consider G's expected payo¤ at the equilibrium. From (8),
2 2pa e pa e (v A + v 1)
It is easy to see that G's expected payo¤ is decreasing in the equilibrium action a e . Therefore, the action that maximizes G's payo¤ in the range given in (6) is a =
. Note that a lies between 0 and 1 (as 2 (0; 1) and v < v).
Next, let us consider the investor's expected payo¤, denoted by E , at the equilibrium. x e 2k
Like G, the investor's expected equilibrium payo¤ is also decreasing in the equilibrium action a e , and therefore maximized at the welfare maximizing equilibrium of the game.
We provides a complete description of the welfare-maximizing equilibrium below:
Expected P ayof f s : EW = (1 )
From now on, we restrict our attention to the above mentioned equilibrium to analyze e¤ects of di¤erent parameters on equilibrium actions and payo¤.
Comparative statics
Certain conclusions are obvious from the set-up. We do not observe resistance to all investment, resistance occurs only when some a¤ected group considers the valuation of the investment to be low, and uses destructive means to demand more compensation. Second, since a is independent of the scale of investment, the total destruction a x is strictly increasing in the scale of investment (for example, due to an increase in productivity k):
Thus, bigger projects face bigger resistance. Also, since higher subsidies are associated with larger scale projects, one can see that there will more destruction of total output will be seen to occur when the volume of subsidies is high, seemingly "explaining" increased resistance to "investor-friendliness" of governments.
Destruction of output
The following proposition tells us how the share of output destroyed, a ; is dependent on the nature of the investment project and the political structure of the society. The proof follows from simple algebra. Notice that a is that level of action where the high type is indi¤erent between taking the action and not doing so. The comparative static e¤ect of ; v and v A can simply be seen from the fact that the gain in transfer t(a)
for a certain level of action (for either type) is decreasing in each of those parameters, while the high type's cost of misrepresentation vax is left una¤ected.
The …rst part of the proposition shows that the more politically marginalised the a¤ected group is, the more destructive action it undertakes. The higher weight a group has in the government's welfare function, the higher share of surplus it gets in each state, and this creates an incentive not to destroy too much of output, since such destruction eventually hurts the total amount of transfer. In particular, for a very marginalized group (if ! 0), it is optimal to destroy almost all output (a ! 1); and for a group that is favoured almost completely, (if ! 1), hardly any surplus is destroyed (a ! 0):
The optimal action a decreases in v A and v because an increase in these parameters increases the marginal valuation of output in each state, creating an incentive to "save" output. Thus, given the political structure, the worse a¤ected a group is in case of a bad outcome, the higher is the resistance.
The intuition for the comparative static in v is a little more subtle. Notice that a is determined by equating the gain in transfer from action t(a) and the high type's cost of taking action. While an increase in v leads to a larger transfer t(a); it also increases the cost of misrepresentation to the high type. The comparative static can go either way depending on whether v is greater or less than v A :
Investor-friendliness
The political structure of the society as encapsulated by may have a signi…cant impact on the deal o¤ered to a foreign investor and consequently, the scale of investment. Proposition 2 tells us that the condition for taxation by the government is
If a e is a ( ); it is easy to see that a decrease in will raise the level of optimal political action, and this may push the government from a tax regime to a subsidy regime.
It is also important to note that the di¤erence between the …rst best tax rate and the optimal tax (j e o j) is increasing in the extent of political action, which is decreasing in
Social Welfare
First, notice that given ; each player's equilibrium welfare is a constant times the government's equilibrium welfare. De…ne V (a) as
Given So far, we have considered a situation where a government has a monopoly power to tax the investor. In the next section we consider a case where two governments are competing to attract the same investor.
Competition between Governments
Suppse there are two "societies" 1 and 2: Each society i is composed of a government G i , two social groups (A i ; B i ) and an investment opportunity. An investment opportunity is denoted by a distribution of valuations (v A i ; p i ; v i ; v i ) and a productivity parameter k i just as in section 2. Suppose that the investor, due to reasons of resource indivisibility, is able to invest in only one of the two societies. The two governments simultaneously make o¤ers to the investor 6 . The sequence of the game is now as follows:
1. Policy stage: Each G i decides the investment tax/subsidy i .simultaneously. The investor's strategy is x 1 ( ) and x 2 ( ), and other strategies are duly modi…ed in natural ways. For the society j where the investor chooses not to invest, i.e. set x j = 0; the social groups and the government get a payo¤ of zero. We assume that strategic variables take their natural trivial values, i.e. a j = 0 and t j = 0; although other, equally trivial but possibly less natural values are possible in equilibria. We also assume, for the sake of comparisom, that in each society, a e i = a i : .The investor accepts whichever o¤er leads to higher pro…ts. Given that I invests in region i, the expected pro…t, as a function of the investment tax, is
Since the expected pro…t is decreasing in i ; we have a Bertrand Competition (i.e. a subsidy war) between the two governments. We measure the "economic strength" of a government by the maximum pro…t it can o¤er the investor, which is given by the minimum tax (maximum subsidy) it can o¤er. Assuming that EW i ( i ) > 0 for the monopoly , as EW i ( ) is strictly concave, the minimum rate that the government i will be willing to o¤er is the unique i < i where EW i ( i ) = 0: It is given by
Substituting i from (12) and after rearranging terms, we get that
Comparing the above with the investor's equilibrium payo¤ when there is no competition, we see that
with additional bargaining power so that he may gain some additional pro…t. Who wins the investment depends on the competitive strength of two societies and the condition is determined by comparing E 1 ( 1 ) with E 2 ( 2 ).
Without loss of generality, we assume that society 1 has the competitive advantage such that
It is easy to see that G 1 wins the investment because of the nature of Bertrand competition in o¤ering subsidy. The following condition will be useful to determine the equilibrium tax/subsidy rate.
If Condition B is violated, then G 1 o¤ers 1 in equilibrium. To see this consider the expected payo¤ of G 1 , which is concave in 1 and is maximized at 1 . If
it can also get the investment because of Condition B. Therefore, 1 is the equilibrium rate o¤ered by G 1 , and society 1 gets the project. If Condition A is violated, we say that society 2 is not a potential competitor to society 1 (de…ned when society 1 is assumed to have the competitive advantage).
When Condition B is satis…ed, the following notation will be useful to characterize the optimal tax/subsidy rate. Let 1 be the investment tax rate charged by G 1 such that
The left side of (14) is the investor's expected payo¤ if it invests in society 1 when investment tax is 1 . The right side of (14) is the investor's payo¤ if it invests in society 2 given an investment tax 2 . If Condition B is satis…ed, we claim that the G 1 o¤ers 1 and G 2 o¤ers 2 in equilibrium and the investor invests in society 1. To see this, note that 2 denotes the minimum possible tax rate that G 2 can o¤er such that it gets a positive surplus. From (14) , we see that G 1 can make the investor indi¤erent between investing in 1 and 2 by o¤ering 1 . By o¤ering a tax rate marginally lower than 1 , G 1 can win the investment with probability 1. In limit, the equilibrium outcome would be charging 1 by G 1 and charging 2 by G 2 and I investing in 1.
The above …ndings are summarized in the following proposition. 
Notice that Condition B re ‡ects a situation when competition between two regions a¤ects the winning society's payo¤. To get more insight on how actions in the losing society may create external impact on the winning society's payo¤, consider equation (14) that determines the equilibrium tax rate in such a situation. After expanding terms, we
Consider a situaton when (v A 2 + v 2 + 1) is positive (negative). The right side of (16) is decreasing (increasing) in a 2 . Since the left side of (16) is always decreasing in 1 , an increase in a 2 can be matched with a increase (decrease) in 1 . Such a change in 1 will be welfare-improving (welfare-reducing) for society 1 as 1 < 1 (and G 1 's expected payo¤ is concave in ). We therefore get the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that society 1 has competitive advantage and society 2 is a potential competitor to 1 (both Condition A and Condition B are satis…ed). The winning society's payo¤ increases as the losing society becomes more action-prone.
Proposition 5 gives important insight in understanding how costly action in a society may create externalities on another society's terms of bargaining with the investor. The need of taking a costly action in our framework is only to solve the local informational problem when the government cares about both groups' utilities. More costly action in society 2 would actually make the investor increasingly lenient towards society 1, and therefore, the bargaining power of G 1 would increase.
Before we conclude, an observation on equlibrium allocation of the project is worth noting. In our framework, the society with competitive advantage wins the project. However, 
Conclusion
In our paper, we constructed a framework of interaction between the government, af- on such destructive actions. According to our framework, rather than legally protect the investor from asset destruction, the government should rather …nancially compensate the investor through appropriate subsidies. We also take the position that the government's "investor-friendliness" should be determined by a comparison of the marginal valuation of the investment by the investor and that by the society. We recognize however that in dealing with an investor, governments may face severe external constraints in the form of competing governments. Not only does this competition mean that the investor bene…ts at the cost of both societies, it may often lead to economic ine¢ ciencies as the investor might want to locate in a less action-prone destination rather than a more productive destination. It is a challenge for governments in less developed economies to solve this problem by co-ordinating with each other. A possible solution would be for the more productive society to get the investment and arrange some side-payments with the other society. We look into such alternative solutions in our further research.
